Government Policy Uncertainty and the Yield Curve by Leippold, Markus & Matthys, Felix
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2664116 
Government Policy Uncertainty and the Yield Curve∗
Markus Leippold† Felix H. A. Matthys‡
August 23, 2017
Abstract
We study the impact of government policy uncertainty on the term structure of nominal
interest rates. We develop a general equilibrium model, in which both the real as well as the
nominal side of the economy are driven by government uncertainty shocks. Our affine yield curve
model captures both the shape of the interest rate term structure as well as the hump-shape of
bond yield volatilities. Our theoretical predictions are strongly supported by the data. Higher
government policy uncertainty leads to a significant decline in yield levels, induces a hump-shaped
increase in bond yield volatility, and increases bond risk premia, especially for longer maturities.
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1 Introduction
Political uncertainty is a ubiquitous byproduct of policymaking. Given the far-reaching impact of
government decisions on the economy, government policy uncertainty has important consequences
for long-run economic growth, asset prices, and welfare. In uncertain times, investors commonly seek
shelter in safe haven assets such as treasury bonds. Consequently, government policy uncertainty
has a direct impact on the term structure of interest rates. For this reason, we examine the link
between government policy uncertainty and yields, the volatility curve, and bond risk premia. We
develop a general equilibrium model, in which policy uncertainty shocks affect both the real and the
nominal side of the economy.
Our model economy consists of a real and a monetary sector with an infinitely lived representative
agent. While the central bank controls money supply on the basis of a Taylor rule, the government
influences the real sector of the economy using a set of different policy instruments.1 To introduce
government policy uncertainty, we let the representative agent form his own expectation about
what policy the government will select. The discrepancy between his expectation and the actual
implemented policy constitutes our measure of government policy uncertainty.2 Therefore, if the
government choses a widely anticipated policy, its impact on the economy is marginal. Contrarily, if
the selected policy deviates considerably from general expectations, it not only triggers large reactions
in financial markets but also adversely affects the economy.
We find that government policy uncertainty impacts both the real and the nominal side in var-
ious different ways. For the real side, it not only negatively affects the long-run growth path of
production, but it also increases its volatility and therefore leads to a worsening of economic growth
prospects, which are fundamental to the agent’s consumption and investment allocation decisions.3
1To keep our analysis focused, we use a reduced form approach when modeling government policies.
2In Croce, Kung, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012) and Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012), (tax) policy uncertainty is
defined as the difference between the actual and expected tax rate. Here, we take the squared difference as a measure of
uncertainty. Following the terminology used in Scotti (2016), the squared difference may serve as a measure of ‘policy
uncertainty,’ the focus of our paper, while the simple difference (positive or negative) may be interpreted as ‘policy
surprise.’
3Our model has some similarities to the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004). However, the key distinctive
difference is that the long-run growth component and the market price of output risk are both driven by the same
underlying risk factor, namely policy uncertainty. This modeling assumption is supported by empirical results by Baker
and Bloom (2013), who show that both first and second order uncertainty shocks explain a significant proportion of
GDP growth. Furthermore, our setting can also be compared to the literature on real business cycle analysis. For
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This observation is in line with Bloom (2009), who argues that productivity growth falls, because
higher uncertainty causes firms to temporarily pause their investments. Hence, an increase in policy
uncertainty renders capital investments more risky, which will eventually induce investors to favor
safe assets such as government bonds. Such a flight-to-quality behavior will raise government bond
prices and therefore drives down their yields.
For the nominal side of the economy, we assume that the central bank conducts its monetary
policy through a Taylor rule, which is affected by policy uncertainty through two different channels.
The first one is a direct effect, where an increase in uncertainty causes the central bank to increase
its money supply, driving down interest rates in the economy. The second channel is indirect. As
policy uncertainty drives both capital accumulation and the price level in the economy, which are
the two main variables entering the Taylor rule, it indirectly influences the central bank’s money
provision.
Our general equilibrium model allows us to study the numerous ways how policy uncertainty
affects not only the level of interest rates, but also how the level and shape of the term structure
of bond yield volatilities react in response to an uncertainty shock. Although our model belongs
to the class of affine models as introduced by Duffie and Kan (1996), we can replicate the typical
hump-shape of the volatility term structure, caused by the empirical observation that volatility tends
to be highest around the two-year maturity bucket.4 The key mechanism leading to this result is
that policy uncertainty negatively affects the long-run growth path of productivity, which translates
into a hump-shaped curve in the term structure of volatility. With this amplification mechanism
we can also explain the ‘excess bond yield volatility puzzle’ that empirical bond yields cannot be
reproduced by standard affine models of the term structure of interest rates (see Shiller (1979) and
Piazzesi and Schneider (2006)).5 Finally, we allow government policy shocks to carry a risk premium.
instance, shocks to trend growth exhibit fundamentally different effects on the (real) economy as opposed to transitory
fluctuations. The agents or country’s reaction to temporary shocks is to borrow in the short run to smooth out
consumption. However, if the shock is more persistent, the long-run consumption level has to be adjusted as borrowing
for an infinite time horizon is not feasible.
4Matching the hump-shape in the volatility data using affine term structure models is a challenging task. For
example, as Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) argue, even with a more flexible specification of market price of risk, their
model is not able to replicate the hump in the term structure of bond volatility. Furthermore, Malkhozov, Mueller,
Vedolin, and Venter (2016) introduce a feedback mechanism in which negative convexity increases the market price of
risk to match the empirical shape of bond yield volatility. Even though their model is able to replicate the hump, it
fails to match the overall level of the term structure of bond volatility.
5A possible solution to this problem is to introduce heterogeneous agents who have different prior beliefs about some
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Hence, our model accommodates time-varying risk premia in bond returns, which implies that policy
uncertainty is a priced risk factor.
Dealing with policy uncertainty, a fundamental question that arises in this context is: What is
an appropriate measure for government and monetary policy uncertainty? In our empirical analysis,
we rely on the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis
(2016) as a proxy for aggregate government policy uncertainty. To motivate our choice, Figure 1
plots the relationship between U.S. treasury bond yields and volatilities together with the EPU
index for the period of January 1990 to September 2015. The first two prominent spikes of the
EPU index are related to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 2nd Gulf War.
By the end of 2003 and until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, the US economy entered
a steady economic growth phase. The EPU declined in the pre-crisis period and started to peak
at the onset of the financial crisis and remains at a high level ever since, exhibiting highly volatile
behavior. We attribute this observation to the fact that the EPU index captures political uncertainty,
which was especially high during the debt-ceiling crisis of 2011 and lasted until late 2013 where some
governmental authorities were even forced to suspend their services temporarily.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 also shows that the EPU index exhibits a countercyclical pattern with nominal yields.
When the EPU index is high, yields tend to go down. This apparent negative relationship is also
confirmed by computing the sample correlation coefficient, which ranges between -0.53 and -0.39 for
the one year and ten year yield, respectively. These numbers suggest that, as political risk increases,
investors seek safer assets and therefore start to shift from stocks to (government) bonds and thereby
lowering yields, which is in line with the predictions in Pastor and Veronesi (2013).6
[Figure 2 about here.]
fundamental economic variable, such as for instance inflation as in Xiong and Yan (2010) or to introduce time-varying
risk preference as in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2007), which are however analytically less tractable.
6Using also the EPU index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), Pastor and Veronesi (2013) show that political
uncertainty raises not only the equity risk premium but also the volatilities and correlations of stock returns.
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There is increasing evidence that policy uncertainty leads to direct reactions of the central bank
authority (see for instance David and Veronesi (2014)). To motivate a link between policy uncertainty
and yields for our model design, we estimate pairwise Vector Auto Regressions (VAR) for the EPU
with the effective fed funds rate, which we take as proxy for monetary policy. Figure 2 reports the
resulting impulse responses for the time period from January 1990 to September 2015. Panel A
reveals that a shock to the EPU index leads to a sustained negative impact on the feds funds rate
and hence on future monetary policy. This impact remains highly significant up to a time horizon
of more than 20 months. In contrast, from Panel B we observe that the impulse response function is
flat at zero. Hence, a shock to the short-term rate has no impact on the EPU index.7 This finding
suggests that policy uncertainty shocks drive monetary policy actions, but not the other way around.
Hence, the central bank conducts its monetary policy taking into account uncertainty shocks from
the real side whereas the central banks interest rate policy does not seem to affect uncertainty.
We provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical observations above. In our model economy,
higher real uncertainty lowers productivity growth, which feeds into the monetary policy through
our assumption that the central bank controls the money supply growth following a Taylor rule.
Hence, the monetary authority’s efforts to stabilize growth (and inflation) causes it to react to real
uncertainty by lowering the cost of capital. Moreover, since we assume money neutrality, nominal
shocks do not have an impact on the real side of the economy. However, the converse is not true. The
equilibrium price level growth is driven by the capital accumulation growth, which implies that the
nominal side is also driven by shocks from the real side, namely government policy uncertainty shocks.
Through these two transmission channels, inflation and capital accumulation growth targeting, the
money supply growth becomes a function of government policy uncertainty. Therefore, by letting the
central bank react endogenously to deviations from long-run capital growth and inflation targets,
we can establish an important link between the real and nominal side of the economy. This link
allows government policy uncertainty to affect nominal quantities, which proves to be essential to
simultaneously match the term structure of interest rates and its corresponding volatility curve.
7Further analyzing the impulse responses from our VAR model, when we add the three month and ten year TB
rate, we find that the EPU index has a similar impact along the entire term structure. However, our study shows that
the short end of the term structure response more strongly to policy uncertainty shocks than the long end does. We
do not report these graphs here, but they can be obtained on request.
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Finally, our affine term structure model is not only able to replicate the empirical shape of both
the level and the volatility of the yield curve, but it also generates theoretical predictions that we can
confirm in an empirical exercise. In particular, we find that higher government policy uncertainty
leads to a significant decline in contemporaneous yield levels, induces a hump-shaped increase in
bond yield volatility, and positively predicts bond risk premia, especially for longer maturities.
Our paper belongs to the class of general equilibrium models of the term structure.8 However,
this literature abstracts from modeling government policy uncertainty and remains silent about its
potential impact on the yield curve. Especially since the European debt crisis starting in 2010
and the 2011 Congress debate about raising the fiscal debt ceiling in the US, policy uncertainty
has attracted considerable interest from academia. For instance, Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013)
develop a general equilibrium model, in which the profitability of firms is driven by government
policy, and discuss the impact of policy risk on stock prices. Additionally, several recent asset
pricing papers have linked fiscal or tax policy uncertainty to a rise in long-run risk, which depresses
innovation and may lead to welfare losses (see, e.g., Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012) and Croce,
Kung, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012)) Besides, numerous empirical papers have shown that uncertainty
about political outcomes has a significant effect on asset returns and corporate decisions.9 There is
also a large strand of literature trying to infer political risk from government bond yields such as,
e.g., Huang, Wu, Yu, and Zhang (2015) who empirically study the relationship between political risk
and government bond yields.10 Hence, we fill a gap in the literature by providing both a theoretical
model on how government policy uncertainty may impact the yield curve and an empirical analysis
of the hypotheses derived from our model.
While the literature on government policy impacts is sparse but growing, the fundamental link
between monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates and volatilities has been studied
8This class of models includes, among many others, Wachter (2006), Piazzesi and Schneider (2006), Buraschi and
Jiltsov (2007), Gallmeyer, Hollifield, Palomino, and Zin (2007), Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xing (2009), and Bansal and
Shaliastovich (2013).
9For instance, early studies include Rodrik (1991) and Pindyck and Solimano (1993). More recently, Durnev (2010)
and Julio and Yook (2012) document that firms tend to withhold their investment activity prior to national elections.
Gulen and Ion (2012) argue, based on the EPU index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), that policy uncertainty
substantially reduces firm and industry level investment. Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov (2012) take the
analysis further and show that some industries are more sensitive to political uncertainty than others. Some further
related articles analyzing the relationship between political uncertainty and asset returns include Belo, Gala, and Li
(2013), Bialkowski, Gottschalk, and Wisnieski (2008) and Bond and Goldstein (2015).
10For an overview of this literature, we refer to Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2014).
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more extensively.11 Despite recent attention brought to modeling the impact of policy uncertainty
on asset prices, the papers mentioned above either address the empirical link between government
bond yields and policy uncertainty or focus on the theoretical impact that a given government policy
has on stock returns. Hence, our paper fills a gap in that it provides both a theoretical framework
and an empirical analysis on the impact of policy uncertainty on the nominal yield curve and on
bond yield volatility.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
discusses the impact of government as well as monetary policy uncertainty on the term structure of
nominal interest rates, the yield volatility curve and the bond risk premium. Section 4 summarizes
our empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The baseline model economy
To introduce uncertainty about the government’s policy, we proceed as follows. For a given govern-
ment policy, Xi,t, which could be, e.g., the corporate tax rate fluctuation as in Croce, Kung, Nguyen,
and Schmid (2012), our representative agent forms his own expectation the government is going to
select. The squared deviation from his expectation and the actual policy implemented by the gov-
ernment is what we refer to as government policy uncertainty for a given policy Xi. Assuming that
the government can implement n different policies, we can define an aggregate government policy
uncertainty (GPU) index as
vt :=
n∑
i=1
(Xi,t − E[Xi,t])2 , (1)
where E[·] represents the unconditional expectation operator. Under the assumption that we can
represent the policies Xi,t as standardized Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, it follows that the dynamics
of vt follow a strictly positive square root process.
12 This policy uncertainty process vt will affect
the real side of the economy through its impact on productivity as well as on output growth.
11For the yield effects we refer to, e.g., Kuttner (2001), Piazzesi (2005), Fleming and Piazzesi (2005), Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005a), and Wright (2012). For the volatility effects see, e.g., Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001),
Piazzesi (2005), and de Goeij and Marquering (2006), among others.
12For a derivation of this result, see Chapter 6 in Jeanblanc, Yor, and Chesney (2009).
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Assumption 1 (Process dynamics). Productivity At, output growth dYt/Yt, and government policy
uncertainty vt follow the dynamics
dAt = (κA(θA −At) + λvt) dt+ σA
√
kA + vtdW
A
t , (2)
dYt
Yt
= (µY + qAAt)dt+ σY
√
kY + vtdW
Y
t , (3)
dvt = κv (θv − vt) dt+ σv√vtdW vt , (4)
where (θA, qA, µY ) ∈ R and (κA, σA, θv, κv, σv, kA, kY ) ∈ R+. We assume that the correlation between
changes in productivity and uncertainty is given by
dWAt dW
v
t = ρAv
√
vt
kA + vt
dt, ρAv ∈ [−1, 1].
All other Brownian motions are mutually independent.
In Equation (2), the parameter λ ∈ R measures the effect of government policy uncertainty vt on
the growth rate of productivity At. Although there is no need to a priori assume a sign restriction
on λ, several papers have found it to be negative (see for instance Bloom (2009), Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2016) or Croce, Kung, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012)). The economic rational for this result is
fairly intuitive. Higher fiscal uncertainty reduces investment which negatively affects productivity.
Running a univariate regression of total factor productivity (TFP) on policy uncertainty, we find
that the relationship is indeed negative and highly significant (see Figure 3).
[Figure 3 about here.]
In our setup, government policy uncertainty not only has a first order impact on productivity,
it also affects its riskiness. By further inspection of Equation (2), policy uncertainty renders pro-
ductivity shocks time-varying, i.e., it introduces stochastic volatility to the productivity process. In
the extreme case where vt approaches zero, the diffusive component becomes constant but does not
vanish entirely. Along the same line of argumentation, riskiness of output growth is mainly driven
by government policy uncertainty shocks.
Having discussed the real side of the economy, we now turn to the specification of the preferences
of our representative agent, who is producing a single good at a constant return-to-scale production
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technology, taking the impact of the government as given. The agent either consumes the good or
reinvests it. As in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), real monetary holdings Mdt provide a transaction
service by reducing the total amount of gross resources required for a given level of consumption Ct.
Assumption 2 (Preferences of representative agent). Let U(Xt) denote utility over the real net
consumption holdings X and let β > 0 denote the subjective discount factor. The agent has constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences and maximizes expected utility,
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−βsU(Xs)ds
]
, (5)
where
U(Xt) =

1
γ (X
γ
t − 1) , if γ < 1, γ 6= 0,
log(Ct) + ξ log
(
Mdt
)
, if γ = 0,
(6)
where γ is equal to one minus the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In addition, the real net
consumption holdings depend on both consumption Ct and real cash balances M
d
t :
13
Xt = Ct · (Mdt )ξ, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. (7)
In the above specification, utility is additive separable in consumption and real cash-balances
whenever γ = 0.14 For the general case, however, separability is lost. We now proceed with the
formulation of the agent’s capital budget constraint.
Assumption 3 (Capital budget constraint). The real return on capital that can either be allocated
to consumption Ctdt or cash balances M
d
t dt or reinvested dKt is given by
dKt
Kt
+
(
Ct
Kt
+
Mdt
Kt
)
dt =
dYt
Yt
− δdt, (8)
where Kt and Yt denote the capital accumulation and output process and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the deprecation
rate.
13If ξ = 0, money does not provide any service and ξ = 1 implies that the agent needs to hold exactly one unit of
currency for every unit of consumption holdings. Since 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1, a higher level of monetary holdings provides a higher
level of transaction services, but at a decreasing return to scale.
14Note that we depart from previous literature in that we impose non-separable CRRA utility for our representative
agent. The non-separability of preferences helps us to better match simultaneously key statistical moments of yields,
their volatilities, and bond excess returns.
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Substituting output growth from Equation(3), we obtain the capital accumulation process as
dKt
Kt
= −
(
Ct
Kt
+
Mdt
Kt
)
dt+ (µY + qAAt − δ) dt+ σY
√
kY + vtdW
Y
t . (9)
The capital accumulation process is decreasing in the optimal control variables consumption Ct and
money demand Mdt . This result is intuitive, since higher Ct and M
d
t diminish available resources
to be invested in the production technology Kt. Similar to real output, capital is nonstationary
whenever it is time-varying in productivity At and µY 6= δ. Furthermore, Equation (9) implies
money-neutrality, i.e., monetary shocks do not have an effect on the real side of the economy.15
For the monetary sector, we assume that there exists a central bank controlling money supply
MSt on the basis of a Taylor rule. The monetary authority targets a long term nominal time-varying
money growth rate mt, a capital growth rate k¯, and an inflation rate equal to p¯i. We assume that
transitory deviations from the optimal long-run money growth exhibit stochastic volatility, which is
driven by government policy uncertainty.16
Assumption 4 (Monetary sector). The central bank controls money supply growth according to a
Taylor rule as follows:
dMSt
MSt
= mtdt+ η1
(
dKt
Kt
− k¯dt
)
+ η2
(
dpt
pt
− p¯idt
)
+ σM
√
kM + vtdW
M
t , (10)
dmt = κm(θm −mt)dt+ σm
√
km + vtdW
m
t , (11)
where pt and Kt are the price level and capital accumulation processes. We fix the correlation
15Whether or not real output and capital are money-shock-neutral is debated in macroeconomics for a long time.
The neo-classical Keynesian literature argues that any increase in money supply has to be offset by an equivalent
proportional rise in prices and wages. A recent paper using a similar setup as ours is Ulrich (2013), who sticks to this
neo-classical view. However, there are a number of reasons why inflation may affect the real economy. See, e.g., Fisher
and Modigliani (1978), who argue that inflation has a direct influence on purchasing power, because many private
contracts are not indexed. A first quantitative study that allows for dependence of the expected return on capital on
inflation is Pennacchi (1991), who uses survey data to identify inflationary expectations. Another channel through
which inflation can affect the real economy is through taxation of nominal asset returns. This channel was exploited
by Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) to account for the violation of the expectation hypothesis and the determination of
the inflation risk premium. Since policy uncertainty affects the real and nominal side of the economy (through the
endogenous equilibrium price level), we assume money-neutrality throughout the paper. However, we acknowledge that
a feasible extension of our model is to let the capital accumulation process be a function of the price level. We leave
this as an interesting theoretical idea which is worthwhile to be considered.
16This modeling assumption is motivated by the observation made in Figure 2. Since uncertainty drives monetary
policy decisions (the converse implications do not seem to hold in the data), we let our measure of government policy
uncertainty vt to also affect the nominal side of the economy.
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structure as follows:
dWMt dW
v
t = ρMv
√
vt
kM + vt
dt, dWmt dW
v
t = ρmv
√
vt
km + vt
dt,
dWAt dW
m
t = ρAm
√
km + vt
kA + vt
dt, dWMt dW
m
t = ρMm
√
km + vt
kM + vt
dt,
while the shocks WMt and W
m
t are independent of all other sources of risk in the economy. Fur-
thermore, to guarantee well-defined correlations, we impose the parameter restrictions kA > km,
kM > km, and ρMv, ρmv, ρAm, ρMm ∈ [−1, 1].
Similar to the real side of the economy, we assume that the process vt also drives uncertainty
in the Taylor rule. The parameters η1 and η2 in Assumption 4 determine the sensitivity of money
supply growth with respect to deviations of endogenous capital and inflation from their long-run
target levels. For example, if output growth is above its target rate k¯dt and provided that η1 < 0,
the monetary authority shrinks the money supply, causing interest rates to rise and investment
activity to slow down. When inflation is below the target rate p¯idt and provided that η2 < 0, the
central bank’s response is to increase money supply. If we have η1 = η2 = 0, money supply is
exogenous and therefore does not react to deviations from long-run capital nor inflation growth rate.
Furthermore, given the money supply rule in Equation (10), policy uncertainty vt renders money
supply time-varying.
Having introduced both the real and monetary side of the economy, we next characterize the
representative agent’s equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium capital stock and money holdings). Under Assumptions 1 to 4, the repre-
sentative agent’s equilibrium is defined as the vector of optimal consumption, money demand, capital,
and price processes [C∗t ,Md∗t ,K∗t , p∗t ] solving the following dynamic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann pro-
gramming problem17
0 =
∂V (t,Kt, At, vt)
∂t
+ max
{Ct,Mdt }
{
U(Ct,M
d
t ) +AV (t,Kt, At, vt)
}
, (12)
subject to money market-clearing MSt = p
∗
tM
d∗
t , the bugdet constraint in (8), and the transversality
condition limt→∞ E
[
e−βtV (t,Kt, At, vt)
]
= 0.
17By A we denote the infinitesimal generator. See, e.g., Øksendal (2003) for technical details.
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For the problem in Equation (12), an explicit solution can only be obtained for the log-utility
case. The resulting optimal consumption and money demand holdings are proportional to capital
Kt. However, up to a first-order approximation in γ, the asymptotic optimal controls Ct and M
d
t
remain linear in the state variables Kt, At, and vt. This feature allows us to find an explicit affine
representation of the term structure of real and nominal interest rates beyond the log-utility case.18
Proposition 2 (Perturbed equilibrium of the representative agent’s investment and consumption
problem). In equilibrium, the representative agent’s value function is
V (t,Kt, At, vt) =
e−βt
βγ
((
eφ(At,vt)Kt
(1+ξ)
)γ − 1) , (13)
for some function φ(At, vt) of the form
φ(At, vt) = φ0(At, vt) + γφ1(At, vt) +O(γ
2). (14)
The agent’s first order asymptotic optimal controls are
C∗,Pt =
βK∗t
1 + ξ
[1 + γ (L− φ0(At, vt))] , Md∗,Pt = ξC∗t , (15)
and the equilibrium first order asymptotic capital accumulation K∗t and price process p∗t satisfy
dK∗t
K∗t
= µK∗ (At, vt) dt+ σA
√
kA + vtdW
Y
t , (16)
dp∗t
p∗t
=
1
1− η2
[
mt − η1k¯ − η2p¯i
1− η2 +
η1 − 1
1− η2
(
µK∗ (At, vt)− σ
2
Y (kA + vt)
(1− η2)
)]
dt
+
σM
√
kM + vt
1− η2 dW
M
t +
(η1 − 1)σY
√
kY + vt
1− η2 dW
Y
t . (17)
where
µK∗ (At, vt) = µY + qAAt − β − δ + γβ (φ0(At, vt)− L) (18)
denotes the equilibrium drift of the capital accumulation process and L := log
(
β1+ξξξ
(1+ξ)1+ξ
)
is a constant.
Furthermore,
φ0 (At, vt) = φ00 + φ0AAt + φ0vvt (19)
is an affine function in the state variables (At, vt) with constants φ00, φ0A, and φ0v provided in
18Our solution strategy is based on the perturbation method. In particular, we follow the approach of Kogan and
Uppal (2001) and approximate our model with respect to the risk aversion parameter around the explicit equilibrium
computed under the log-utility assumption. Perturbation methods have been successfully applied in many other studies
such as, e.g., Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008).
11
Appendix A.2.
Since nominal shocks have no real effects, the equilibrium capital accumulation process is only
driven by the real sector of the economy, i.e., by productivity At and by the uncertainty process vt.
The weighting factor η2 on inflation-target deviation enters nonlinearly into the equilibrium price
process.19 We also find that for γ = 0 the equilibrium capital drift µK∗ becomes independent of vt.
Furthermore, γ has a first-order effect on the representative agent’s optimal consumption policy and
money demand C∗t and M∗t . They both become dependent on policy uncertainty vt and productivity
At. Since the constant φ0A is positive, whereas φ0v is negative (see Equation (A.26)), an increase in
productivity increases consumption and money demand, while an increase in uncertainty vt leads to
a decrease. Notably, these effects are absent in the log-utility case.
Proposition 2 also implies that the equilibrium price process is affected by uncertainty shocks
through two channels. First, vt affects the money supply directly through rendering money growth
volatility time-varying (see Equation (10)). Secondly, as a direct consequence of the equilibrium
market clearing condition MSt = p
∗
tM
d
t and because the central bank authority is controlling money
supply growth based on a Taylor-rule, uncertainty shocks from the real side will propagate to the
nominal side whenever η1 6= η2 6= 0. Hence, by endogenizing money supply growth, we allow for
an important link between the real and the nominal sector. This link will prove to be essential
in capturing key empirical properties of the yield curve, its corresponding term structure of yield
volatility, and bond risk premia.
3 The term structure of nominal interest rates
Having obtained the dynamics of the equilibrium price level, we can now solve for the term structure
of nominal and real bond prices. Let B(t, τ) be the nominal pure discount bond paying one unit of
currency at time T = t+ τ . The price of the nominal bond must satisfy the following Euler equation
B(t, τ) = e−βτEt
[
∂U(C∗t+τ ,Md∗t+τ )/∂C∗t+τ
∂U(C∗t ,Md∗t )/∂C∗t
p∗t
p∗t+τ
]
= e−βτEt
[
exp{− log (K∗t+τ)}
exp{− log (K∗t )}
p∗t
p∗t+τ
]
, (20)
19Note that for η2 ≈ 1, small innovations in either At or vt result in dramatic changes in the equilibrium price
process. However, from an economic viewpoint, the parameter η2 should be negative which, as we will see later, is
confirmed by the data.
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i.e., in equilibrium the investor should be indifferent between consuming one more unit of currency
now or investing one unit of currency in the nominal discount bond with time to maturity τ .
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium nominal term structure of interest rates). In our model economy, the
nominal discount bond B(t, τ) with time to maturity τ is given by
B(t, τ) = exp [−b0(τ)− bA(τ)At − bv(τ)vt − bm(τ)mt] , (21)
with
bA(τ) = CA
1− e−κAτ
κA
, (22)
−b′v(τ) = Z0v(τ) + Z1v(τ)bv(τ) + Z2vb2v(τ), (23)
bm(τ) = − 1− e
−κmτ
(η2 − 1)κm , (24)
b0(τ) =
∫ τ
0
C0(u)du. (25)
The constant parameters CA and Z2v and the deterministic functions Z0v(τ), Z1v(τ), and C0(τ) are
provided in Appendix A.3.
The nominal term structure of interest rates in Proposition 3 belongs to the exponential affine
class of term structure models introduced by Duffie and Kan (1996). Consequently, the yield curve
Y (t, τ), defined as
Y (t, τ) = −1
τ
log (B(t, τ)) =
b0(τ)
τ
+
bA(τ)
τ
At +
bv(τ)
τ
vt +
bm(τ)
τ
mt, (26)
is affine in the state variables At, vt, and mt. Analyzing the expressions for the constant Z2v and
CA as well as the time-dependent functions Z1v, Z0v(τ), and C0(τ) given in Appendix A.3, we make
the following three observations.
First, the target growth rates for output k¯ and inflation p¯i, the depreciation rate δ, and output
growth rate µY solely affect the intercept of the yield curve, but not its slope. The same holds true
for the long-run level of all the three factors, i.e., θi, i = {A, v,m}. In contrast, the central bank’s
weighting factors η1 and η2 affect both the intercept and slope of the yield curve. Moreover, they do
so in a nonlinear way.
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Our second observation relates to the government policy uncertainty variable vt. It has a key
impact not only on the level of the term structure, but also on its slope. Recall that the trend growth
rate of the productivity process At not only depends on the long-run level of productivity θA, but
also on the long-run level of policy uncertainty θv. In particular, we have E[At] = θA + λθvκA . Since
λ < 0, policy uncertainty shocks reduce the long-run level of productivity which has a key impact on
the representative agents investment and consumption decision. This effect is amplified if shocks to
productivity are persistent, i.e., if κA is low. Moreover, this dependence in turn implies that λ also
affects the slope of the term structure through bv(τ). In summary, fiscal uncertainty affects the term
structure of interest rates not only through several channels, but it does so also in a nontrivial way.
As a third observation, we find that the subjective discount factor β and the degree of transaction
service money provides ξ also impact the slope of the yield curve through the factor loadings bA(τ)
and bv(τ) whenever γ 6= 0. Hence, if the representative agent would have log-utility, this channel
would be switched off and β and ξ would exhibit only a level effect.
3.1 Equilibrium nominal short rate and bond excess returns
We now discuss how the short end of the term structure of interest rates and the bond risk premium
are affected by economic policy uncertainty.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium nominal short rate and bond risk premium). In our model economy,
we have the following first order asymptotic results:
1. The nominal short rate Rt is affine in the state variables:
Rt = K0 + CAAt + Cmmt + Cvvt, (27)
where the constants K0, CA, Cm, Cv are given in Equations (A.48) to (A.50).
2. The bond risk premium BRP (t, τ) per unit of time is given by
BRP (t, τ) =
1
dt
Et
[
dB(t, τ)
B(t, τ)
−Rtdt
]
= bv(τ)(k0,Λ + k1,Λvt) =: Λ
N
t (τ), (28)
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where we denote by ΛNt (τ) the nominal risk premium of government policy uncertainty and the
constants k0,Λ and k1,Λ are defined as
k0,Λ := kM
σMσmρMm
η2 − 1 , k1,Λ :=
σMσmρMm + σvρMvρMvσM
η2 − 1 . (29)
The nominal short rate and the nominal market price of risk are all influenced by both the real
and nominal sector of the economy, which is a direct consequence of the Taylor rule in Assumption
4. In the special case when the central bank is inactive, i.e., η1 = η2 = 0, it follows from the Taylor
equation (11) that money supply is entirely decoupled from the real sector. In this special case, the
nominal short rate reduces to
Rt = β +mt − (kM + vt)σ2M , (30)
which shows that the nominal short rate is only driven by the nominal side of the economy, i.e.,
output growth and productivity do not affect the nominal short rate. Therefore, introducing an
active Taylor rule in (11) opens up a link for real shocks to affect the nominal side of the economy.
In Equation (28) of Proposition 4, bond risk premia are solely driven by policy uncertainty. The
loading factor ΛNt (τ) allows bond risk premia to be positive or negative depending on the fitted
parameter values of the model. As was the case for the nominal short rate, the central bank’s
reaction parameters η1 and η2 affect the nominal risk premium of policy uncertainty through several
channels. First, they impact the level of bond risk premia through the term k0,Λ in Equation (28).
Second, since η1 and η2 also enter the factor loading bv(τ), they determine the slope and curvature
which eventually enables us to match more complex empirical shapes of bond risk premia.
3.2 Data
We obtain monthly Treasury Bill yields with maturity one, two, three, five, seven, and ten years
from the Federal Reserve Board ranging from January 1990 until September 2015, from which we
bootstrap the zero-coupon yield curve treating the treasury yields as par yields. For our measure of
observed volatility, we use realized volatility aggregated on a monthly level from business day data:
Vt(Y (t, τ)) =
√√√√100× D−1∑
d=1
(
log
(
Y (d+ 1, τ)
Y (d, τ)
))2
, Y (d, τ), d ∈ {1, . . . , D − 1}, (31)
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where D denotes the number of daily observations (about 20 business days per month t) and τ is the
bond yield maturity. To match k¯ we estimate potential output, which we obtain from the database
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). The time series is called ’real potential gross
domestic product’ (GDPPOT).
As a proxy for economic policy uncertainty, our process vt, we use the economic policy uncertainty
(EPU) index constructed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016).20 The EPU index has three main
components, namely a news impact component which is based on news paper discussing economic
policy uncertainty, a component that summarizes reports by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
that compile lists of temporary federal tax code provisions, and a third component called ‘economic
forecaster disagreement’, which draws on the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of
Professional Forecasters and summarizes data on consumer price forecast dispersion and predictions
for purchases of goods and services by state, local and federal government.21
To test the robustness of the results from our regression analysis, we introduce different control
variates. First, we check whether policy uncertainty has still predictive power after controlling for
the state of the economy. The reason why we do so is, arguably, uncertainty about the government’s
future policy tends to be larger in weaker economic conditions. To proxy for these economic conditions
(EC), we use the VIX index, the treasury bond implied volatility (TIV), and the Chicago Fed National
Activity Index (CFNAI).22 Second, we collect two time series, which we refer to as financial variables
(FV). They include the monthly log growth rate of the S&P composite dividend yield index (DY),
which has been shown to have forecasting power by Fama and French (1989), and, following Campbell
and Shiller (1991), the term spread (TS) measured as the ten-year yield less the federal funds rate.
Finally, as macroeconomic controls (MC), we collect from Datastream monthly data on industrial
20The EPU index can be downloaded from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/. The EPU has been recently used
by a number of studies. For instance, Pastor and Veronesi (2013) show that government policy uncertainty carries
a risk premium, and that stocks are more volatile and more correlated in times of high uncertainty. Brogaard and
Detzel (2015) use the same index and find that economic policy uncertainty forecast future market excess returns.
Similarly, Gulen and Ion (2012) show that policy-related uncertainty is negatively correlated with firm and industry
level investment. When policy uncertainty increases firm’s tend to reduce their investment.
21As Kelly, Pa´stor, and Veronesi (2016) argue, it is difficult isolate exogenous variation in political uncertainty
as it likely depends on various factors such as overall macro uncertainty. Therefore, the EPU index may not only
capture government related uncertainty, but can be interpreted as a broader measure of uncertainty about economic
fundamentals.
22The TIV is based on a weighted average of one-month options on treasury bonds with maturity of two, five, ten, and
30 years as a proxy for bond market volatility. It has been widely used in the literature on empirical bond predictability,
see for instance Malkhozov, Mueller, Vedolin, and Venter (2016). The CFNAI is obtained from the FRED database.
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production (IP) as a measure for real business cycle activity and on the consumer price index (CPI)
as a measure for inflation.23
3.3 Model Calibration
To calibrate our model to the data, we proceed as follows. In a first step, we perform a maximum
likelihood estimation using the EPU index to obtain the parameters of our policy uncertainty process
vt. In a second step, since the Federal Open Market Committee considers an annual inflation of 2%
consistent with the Federal Reserve’s mandate for price stability and maximum employment, we fix
our monthly inflation target p¯i accordingly. For the central bank’s target of long-run output growth,
we consider a value for k¯ so that it matches the monthly growth rate of potential output (GDPPOT).
In a third step, the remaining parameters are then used to calibrate the unconditional model-implied
yield and volatility term structure to their empirical unconditional level and volatility term structure.
For the yield curve, we average the monthly nominal yields over the whole sample period using
Y (τ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Y (t, τ), τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10}, (32)
where T denotes the length of the time series. Our measure for the unconditional realized yield
volatility is
V(Y (t, τ)) = 1
T
T−1∑
t=1
Vt(Y (t, τ)), t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, (33)
with Vt(Y (t, τ)) given in Equation (31). For calibrating the model, we use as objective function
min
Θ
V (Θ) =
M∑
τ=1
(∣∣Y (τ)− E[Y (t, τ)]∣∣+ ∣∣∣V(Y (t, τ))−√V[dY (t, τ)]∣∣∣) , (34)
where M = 6 is the number of maturities and Θ denotes the set of parameters. In total, there are
26 parameters to calibrate. The terms E[Y (t, τ)] and V[dY (t, τ)] are the model-implied mean and
variance of the term structure, which are available in closed form and provided in Appendix A.5.
[Table 1 about here.]
23Similar control variables have also been used by Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Evans and Marshall (2007), Ludvigson
and Ng (2009), and Joslin, Priebisch, and Singleton (2014) to study the economic determinants of the term structure of
nominal interest rates. We also included other commonly used macroeconomic variables, such as employment, personal
income, producer price index, the new orders index, and new private housing units started, etc., but our conclusions
did not change.
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We summarize the calibration results in Table 1. For the policy uncertainty dynamics specified
in Assumption 1, we see from Panel A that the speed of mean-reversion κv implies a half-life of a
shock of − log(0.5)/κv = 4.1 months. Hence, it takes a little more than four months for a shock
to economic policy uncertainty to die out by half. The long-run uncertainty level is characterized
by the parameter θv, which can also be interpreted (and estimated) as the average economic policy
uncertainty level over the estimation time period. Lastly, the parameter σv measures the fluctuation
of the time series.
From Panel C, it is interesting to note that our estimate of γ implies a relative risk aversion
coefficient of 1.47 for the representative agent, which differs substantially from the standard log-
utility case with a risk aversion of one.24 As we have derived in our theoretical analysis, risk-aversion
has a first-order effect on the equilibrium capital drift µK∗ , the agent’s optimal consumption policy
C∗t , and on money demand M∗t . Hence, given our estimate of γ, these effects can be substantial and
they would be completely absent in a log-utility setting. Furthermore, we see that the calibrated
parameter ξ = 0.463. Hence, monetary holdings do generate transaction services.
For the monetary sector as specified in Assumption 4, the estimates of the sensitivity parameters
η1 and η2 turn out to be negative. The central bank is decreasing its money supply whenever capital
growth or inflation are above their respective target rates k¯ and p¯i. This result confirms our intuition
and is in line with the decisions taken by the Federal Reserve. Lastly, the calibrated parameter
λ is large and negative. Therefore, policy uncertainty negatively affects both output growth and
productivity, corroborating the findings in Rodrik (1991), Bloom (2009), and Gulen and Ion (2012).
[Figure 4 about here.]
24Departing from the log utility assumption turns out to have non-trivial effects. After recalibrating the model using
the parameters in Table 1 as starting values and restricting γ = 0 we find the following: While the fit of the average
term structure and the volatility curve is comparable, for nearly all maturities, the model fails to produce model-implied
beta coefficients, which are statistically indistinguishable from their empirical counterparts. The model-implied betas
for the univariate yield regression are now not low enough and do not lie within the 95% confidence band around the
empirically estimated coefficients. Furthermore, regarding the model-implied response of volatility to an increase in
policy uncertainty, we find that, first, the model-implied coefficients are still positive but too low (not within 95%
confidence band) and second, they do not exhibit the hump-shape pattern their empirical counterparts show. Finally,
the model-implied beta coefficients underestimate the response of bond excess returns due to an increase in policy
uncertainty. This is especially true at the long end.
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In Figure 4, we plot the calibrated term structure and its volatility curve for all maturities τ . In
Panel A, we observe that the model is able to replicate the overall level, slope, and curvature of the
term structure. The model slightly over (under)- estimates the actual level of the yield curve at the
short (medium to long) end. However, the overall root mean squared error (RMSE) along the entire
term structure is 0.135.25 As Panel B of Figure 4 shows, our model accurately matches the volatility
data for short (one year maturity) to medium term maturities (up to seven years). Importantly, we
can replicate the typical volatility hump at two year maturity. The RMSE for the bond volatility
calibration is only 0.037.
Many empirical studies find it notoriously difficult to match the term structure of yield volatility,
particularly within the framework of affine term structure models. Indeed, even with their more
flexible specification of essentially affine price of risk, Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) acknowledge that
their model cannot fully match the second moments of yields. While their model captures the overall
declining pattern of volatilities, it fails to generate the volatility hump. Moreover, the model-implied
volatilities remain substantially below their empirical counterparts (see their Table 9). Admittedly,
they perform quasi-maximum likelihood estimation only on yields. In a more recent endeavor,
Malkhozov, Mueller, Vedolin, and Venter (2016) succeed in generating a hump, but they fail to
match the level accurately (see their Figure 6). These results exemplify the intrinsic challenge of
matching both the level of volatilities and the volatility hump.26 In contrast, we find that our model is
rich enough to match the unconditional term structure and the high level of volatility simultaneously,
while replicating the typical hump-shape in the bond volatility curve.
25The error is calculated as RMSE =
√
1
T
∑
τ∈M (E[Y (t, τ)− Y (t, τ)])2 where M = 6 is the number of maturities,
E[Y (t, τ)] is the model-implied unconditional yield curve and Y (t, τi) defines the unconditional sample average of yields.
The same formula is applied compute the error along the volatility and correlation curve.
26Already Shiller (1979) shows that long term bond yields exhibit excess volatility relative to their model-implied
values. From Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) we know that their representative agent-based model explains a smaller
fraction of observed volatility of the long-end yields than of the short-end yields. Xiong and Yan (2010) argue that
excess bond volatility might be due to differences in beliefs about the long-run level of inflation. They show that
a higher belief dispersion leads to volatility amplification which allows them to account not only for the empirically
observed high bond yield volatility, but also for the hump-shape of the term structure of bond volatility. Closely related
to the ’excess volatility puzzle’ phenomenon are also the findings of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b). They
document that bond yields exhibit excess sensitivity to macroeconomic announcements.
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3.4 Yield curve and policy uncertainty
Based on our fitted model parameters, we can now explore a series of implications regarding the
effect of policy uncertainty on the term structure of interest rates, bond yield curve, and bond risk
premia. We start our analysis by investigating the relationship between nominal bond yields and
policy uncertainty as measured by the EPU index. The preliminary empirical analysis between nom-
inal bond yields and policy uncertainty shows that there is significant negative correlation between
economic policy uncertainty and the level of the yield curve, which we observed in Figure 1, Panel
A. Indeed, given the yields in Equation (26), we have that
∂Y (t, τ)
∂vt
=
bv(τ)
τ
< 0, ∀τ ≥ 0. (35)
The inequality in Equation (35) follows from the calibrated factor loadings bv(τ), which we report in
Table 2. Clearly, the loadings bv(τ) are negative for all τ ≥ 0. Hence, nominal yields decline when
policy uncertainty increases.
[Table 2 about here.]
A second implication of our term structure model is that nominal yields are negatively correlated
with economic policy uncertainty, i.e., Corr [Y (t, τ), vt] ≤ 0, given the fitted parameters in Table
1. Evaluating the model-implied correlations across different maturities gives an average correla-
tion between nominal yields and the EPU of -0.667, which is comparable with the average sample
correlation of -0.4835.
For the impact of a change in policy uncertainty on the term structure of bond yield volatility, we
find that the conditional model-implied volatility curve
√
Vt[dY (t, τ)] given in (A.57) is increasing
in policy uncertainty vt:
∂
√
Vt[dY (t, τ)]
∂vt
=
Γ1(τ)
2
√
Γ0(τ) + Γ1(τ)vt
> 0, ∀τ ≥ 0 (36)
where the functions Γ0(τ), Γ1(τ) : τ → R+ are given in Equation (A.59). Furthermore, given the
calibrated parameters in Table 1, the expression in Equation (36) is hump-shaped across maturity τ
and peaks at two year maturity (see Figure 4).
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4 Empirical analysis
Given the calibrated values in Table 1, our term structure model gives rise to several model-implied
predictions. From the discussion above, we can formulate four testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Nominal yields fall when policy uncertainty increases. This hypothesis fol-
lows from Equation (35).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Higher (lower) economic policy uncertainty increases (decreases) nominal
yield volatility. This hypothesis follows from the positive loading function Γ1(τ) in Equation (36).
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The hump shape of the term structure of bond yield volatility is driven
by policy uncertainty and peaks around the two-year maturity. This hypothesis follows from the
expression in Equation (36) and its shape, given the calibrated parameters in Table 1.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Bond risk premia are increasing in policy uncertainty. This hypothesis follows
from Equation (28) and the calibrated parameters in Table 1, which imply ∂ΛNt (τ)/∂vt > 0.
To empirically test the above hypotheses, we regress nominal yields (Y ), yield volatility (V ),
and bond excess returns (BRP ) on the EPU index. We then compare these estimated regression
coefficients to their model-implied counterparts, which we derive in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5 (Model-implied regression coefficients). In our model economy, we have the following
results for the model-implied regression coefficients βMI :
1. The unconditional model-implied regression coefficient βMIY of a univariate regression of nom-
inal yields Y (t, τ) onto policy uncertainty vt is given by
βMIY =
C[Y (t, τ), vt]
V(vt)
=
1
τ
(
bA(τ)C[At, vt]
V(vt)
+ bv(τ) +
bm(τ)C[mt, vt]
V[vt]
)
. (37)
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2. The first-order approximate unconditional model-implied regression coefficient βMIY of a uni-
variate regression of bond volatility
√
Vt[dY (t, τ)] onto policy uncertainty vt is
βMIV =
C
(√
Vt[dY (t, τ)], vt
)
V(vt)
≈ Γ1(τ)
2
√
Γ0(τ) + Γ1(τ)θv
, (38)
where the Taylor expansion of
√
vt is evaluated at the unconditional first moment of vt, i.e.,
E(vt) = θv.
3. The theoretical slope coefficient βMIBRP of a univariate regression of excess returns r
E,τ
t,t+h =
log (B(t+ h, τ − h))− log (B(t, τ))−Y (t, h) over a time period t to t+h onto policy uncertainty
vt is given by
βMIBRP =
C
(
rE,τt,t+h, vt
)
V(vt)
=
Ω(t, τ, h)
V(vt)
, (39)
where the covariance term Ω(t, τ, h) is given in Equation (A.66) and the denominator is given
in Equation (A.7).
In what follows, we compare the estimated regression coefficients β̂i with their theoretical coun-
terparts βMIi , i ∈ {Y, V,BRP}, for each univariate regression of yields, bond volatility, and bond
excess return onto policy uncertainty. To test for robustness of our results, we subsequently add
several control variables.
4.1 Policy uncertainty and the yield curve
To investigate the relationship between the yield curve and the EPU index, we start with the following
univariate regression,
Y (t, τ) = β0 + βYEPUt + t, τ = 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, (40)
where EPUt denotes the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index at time t and t is the regression
error term.27 According to hypothesis H1, we expect the coefficient in Equation (40) to be negative
for every maturity τ . Furthermore, if the model is able to replicate the data, the theoretical beta
βMIY should lie within the confidence interval around its empirical counterpart β̂Y .
27To address potential concerns about robustness of our results, following Newey and West (1994), we compute
standard errors with five lags to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) in residuals.
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[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 presents the results from the comparison of βMIY and β̂Y . We can draw two conclusions.
First, from Panel A we observe that the impact of an increase in economic policy uncertainty on the
level of yields is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level across all maturities, confirming
our hypothesis H1. Moreover, not only is the EPU index a statistically significant predictor, its
impact on the level of the term structure is also economically substantial. For instance, the estimated
coefficients imply that a one standard deviation change in the EPU index will lead to a decline in
the one year yield of 1.07%.28 Second, the model-implied regression coefficients βMIY lie within the
95% confidence interval. Hence, the model-implied betas are not statistically different from their
empirical regression betas β̂Y .
To check for robustness, we add different controls to the regression equation, controlling for
economic, financial, and macroeconomic conditions, as discussed in Section 3.2. Panel B of Figure
5 plots the resulting regression coefficient β̂Y together with the confidence bounds. We find that
the negative relationship between nominal yields and policy uncertainty is robust using different
controls and remains statistically significant. Table 3 provides an overview of the different regression
results. Most strikingly, the EPU is significant for any maturity and across all regressions. The
predictive power of the EPU index is reflected also in the R2adj values. Using the EPU as single
predictor, it explains 15% to 28% of the variation in the term structure, depending on the time to
maturity. Moreover, whereas the R2adj values essentially stay the same after adding different controls
for economic and macroeconomic conditions, they increase considerably when adding the financial
variables. Both the S&P dividend yield and the term spread are statistically significant. Adding
macroeconomic controls to the regression equation has only a marginal impact on the statistical
significance and the magnitude of the EPU index, and leads only to a small increase in the R2adj
values.29
[Table 3 about here.]
28This estimate is computed as the estimated slope coefficient β̂Y,1 = −3.715 for the one year yield times the standard
deviation of the EPU (0.34).
29The increase in R2adj is entirely driven by inflation as it has a statistically significant and positive impact on the
term structure of nominal interest rates.
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4.2 The term structure of bond yield volatility and policy uncertainty
Hypotheses H2 and H3 state that the inclusion of a time-varying policy risk factor not only raises
the level of the bond volatility curve, but is also a key driver in generating the empirically observed
hump shape of the bond volatility term structure. Thus, we should observe a positive regression
coefficient peaking around the two year maturity bucket, similar to the realized bond volatility curve
in Figure 4. To test these predictions, we regress the conditional volatility Vt(Y (t, τ)) on the EPU
index:
Vt(Y (t, τ)) = β0 + βVEPUt + t, τ = 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10. (41)
To check for robustness, we include the same control variables as in the previous section.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 6, Panel A, corroborates our hypotheses. The regression coefficient is positive and statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level across all maturities. Hence, in line with hypothesis H2, an increase
in economic policy uncertainty raises the level of bond yield volatility. Moreover, all model-implied
regression coefficients βMIV,τ lie within the 95% confidence interval. Hence, our model-implied betas
are statistically not different from their empirical counterparts β̂V,τ . Remarkably, both the model-
implied and the empirical estimate peak at two year maturity, thereby confirming our hypothesis
H3 that the impact of policy uncertainty is hump-shaped in time to maturity. The impact of the
EPU on bond yield volatilities is not only statistically but also economically significant. At the two
year maturity, a one standard deviation increase in the EPU increases the monthly realized bond
volatility by 0.425%.30 Comparing this number to the average level of the bond volatility curve as
shown in Panel B of Figure 4, where the unconditional level of the two year yield volatility is 1.24%,
the estimated impact of a one standard deviation increase in the EPU corresponds to a 34% increase
in the two year bond yield volatility.
In Panel B of Figure 6, we plot the regression coefficient when we include all the variables
controlling for economic, financial, and macroeconomic conditions, as we did in Figure 5. Also in
this case, our results are robust. The impact of economic policy uncertainty on bond yield volatilities
30This number is computed as the estimated slope coefficient times the standard deviation of EPU index (0.21).
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remains positive and hump-shaped. Table 4 gives an overview of the different regression results. As
for the yield regressions, the EPU remains a highly significant factor in determining bond yield
volatilities. Our hypotheses H2 and H3 are supported by the data even after controlling for a
number of variables. Not only does realized volatility rise when policy uncertainty increases, its
effect is also hump-shaped with a peak around a maturity of two years.31 Moreover, the EPU index
exhibits high explanatory power. Across different maturities, the R2adj values range between 34%
and 45%.
[Table 4 about here.]
4.3 Bond risk premia
To explore the predictive power of the EPU index for future bond excess returns, we run the univariate
regression
rE,τt,t+1 = β0 + βBRPEPUt + t, τ = 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, (42)
where the bond excess return rE,τt,t+1 is defined as the log-excess return from buying at time t a bond
with time-to-maturity τ and selling it after one month:
rE,τt,t+1 = log (B(t+ 1, τ − 1))− log (B(t, τ))− Y (t, 1). (43)
Our Hypothesis H4 states that government policy uncertainty should explain bond risk premia
and, given the calibrated parameters in Table 1, that bond excess returns are increasing in policy
uncertainty. Therefore, we expect the estimated coefficient β̂BRP in the regression (42) to be positive
and increasing in maturity.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Figure 7, Panel A, plots the theoretical betas βMIBRP together with their empirical counterparts
β̂BRP resulting from regression (42). In general, our model predictions H4 are confirmed. Not only is
31An exception is when we add only the controls for the economic conditions. In this case, the hump-shaped
impact of the EPU index on the term structure disappears. However, the impact of the economic condition controls is
insignificant.
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the EPU index a statistically significant predictor, its impact on bond risk premia is also economically
substantial. For instance, the estimated coefficients imply that a one standard deviation change in
the EPU index will lead to an increase of 2.39% in the expected 10-year bond excess return, which
is again substantial given the average 10-year bond excess return of 5.391%.32 Furthermore, except
for the 2 and 3 years excess return, the null hypothesis that the model-implied beta coefficients are
equal to their empirical counterparts is not rejected at the 5% confidence level.
To check the robustness of our results, we enrich our previous set of controls for economic,
financial, and macroeconomic conditions with an additional set of control variables extracted from
the yield curve. The literature on bond risk premia usually tests the predictive power of a new
predictor variable against the routinely used Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) factor (CP), which is
constructed based on a tent-shaped linear combination of forward rates.33 To construct the CP
factor, we use the log forward rates, defined as F (t, τ) = log(B(t, τ − 1)/B(t, τ)). Furthermore, from
the covariance matrix of yields, we extract the first three principal components which are commonly
referred to as ’level’, ’slope’, and ’curvature’ (see Litterman and Scheinkman (1991)).
[Table 5 about here.]
From Figure 7, Panel B, the impact of the EPU on bond risk premia changes only slightly.
While we still observe a substantial positive relationship between the EPU and bond risk premia
that increases with maturity, some of the statistical significance is lost at the short end of the curve.
Table 5 gives a detailed overview on our bond risk premium regression. We observe that, when adding
the principal components and the CP factor, the impact of the EPU index is significantly reduced.
The CP factor is highly significant for most maturities. Moreover, the explanatory power increases
substantially. While the R2adj values for the univariate regression on the EPU range between 1% for
the two-year maturity to 32% for the 10 year maturity, the R2adj ranges from 31% (two years) to 72%
(five years) when including the term structure controls. Most of this increase is driven by the CP
32This estimate is computed as the estimated slope coefficient β̂BRP,10 = 6.746 for the 10 year excess return times
the standard deviation of the EPU (0.80).
33A detailed description of the construction of this factor is given in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). To avoid
collinearity problems, we only include the current one year yield Y (t, 1) and the five and ten year forward rates and
we do not restrict the regression coefficients to sum up to one.
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factor. Adding the controls for economic, financial, and macroeconomic condition, we observe that
the S&P dividend yield and the current slope of the term structure are highly significant, leading
to a sharp increase in R2adj values at shorter maturities. Lastly, adding the macro control variables
leaves the explanatory power of the EPU index essentially unchanged. Hence, overall our hypothesis
H4 is confirmed in that economic policy uncertainty has a positive and, except at the short end,
significant impact on bond risk premia.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that allows us to study
the impact of policy uncertainty shocks on the term structure of interest rates, the yield volatility
curve, and bond risk premia. Unlike previous literature, we equip the representative agent with
non-separable CRRA preferences and derive nominal bond prices in closed form up to a first-order
perturbation in the agent’s risk aversion coefficient.
Even though our model belongs to the class of affine term structure models, it is capable of
reproducing simultaneously the shape of the term structure of yields and volatilities, including the
hump-shape of volatilities which several affine term structure models fail to achieve. Moreover, our
model leads to a set of predictions for policy uncertainty and its impact on the interest rate term
structure. Our empirical tests provide strong support for these predictions. First, our calibrated
model implies a negative relationship between policy uncertainty and the level of yields, which is in
line with the well known empirical flight-to-quality behavior, i.e., investors seek safe assets in times
of high uncertainty. Second, our model is able to match the empirically observed (hump-shaped)
increase in yield volatility in response to uncertainty shocks. Lastly, our model predicts that the risk
premia on policy uncertainty is positive and increasing, which is also largely supported by the data.
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A Proofs
A.1 Moment Formulas
Let 0 ≤ t ≤ s and define vs = e−κv(s−t)Vs, Vt = vt > 0. Then an application of Itoˆ’s lemma shows
that
dvs = −κve−κv(s−t)Vsds+ e−κv(s−t)dVs = −κvvsds+ e−κv(s−t)dVs (A.1)
Rearranging this expression, we find
e−κv(s−t)dVs = κvθvvsds+ σv
√
vsdW
v
s , (A.2)
which after using vs = e
−κv(s−t)Vs gives us
vs = vte
−κv(s−t) + θv
(
1− e−κv(s−t)
)
+ σve
−κv(s−t)
∫ s
t
eκv(u−t)
√
vudW
v
u . (A.3)
Using the same substitution, we get for the productivity As and money supply factor ms the following
expressions
As = Ate
−κA(s−t) + θA
(
1− e−κA(s−t)
)
+ λe−κA(s−t)
∫ s
t
eκA(u−t)vudu
+ σAe
−κA(s−t)
∫ s
t
eκA(u−t)
√
kA + vudW
A
u , At ∈ R (A.4)
ms = mte
−κm(s−t) + θm
(
1− e−κm(s−t)
)
+ σme
−κm(s−t)
∫ s
t
eκm(u−t)
√
km + vudW
m
u , mt ∈ R+
The unconditional covariance of vt and vs,
C(vs, vt) = E[vsvt]− E[vs]E[vt] = E[Et[vs]vt]− E[vs]E[vt], (A.5)
is then obtained as
C(vs, vt) = E
[(
θv + (vt − θv)e−κv(s−t)
)
vt
]
− θ2v =
(
E
[
v2t
]− θ2v) e−κv(s−t) = θvσ2v2κv e−κv(s−t), (A.6)
with 0 ≤ t ≤ s. The unconditional variance follows directly as
V[vt] =
θvσ
2
v
2κv
. (A.7)
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Similarly, for the unconditional covariance between the productivity process As, monetary factor ms,
and the policy uncertainty process vt at time t and s, 0 ≤ t ≤ s, we get
C(As, vt) =
e−(s−t)κAθvρAvσvσA
κA + κv
+
e−(s−t)κAθvλσ2v
2κv(κA + κv)
+
(
e−sκv − e−(s−t)κA−tκv) θvλσ2v
2κv(κA − κv) , (A.8)
C(ms, vt) =
ρmvσmσv
κm + κv
e−κm(s−t). (A.9)
The expressions for C[At,ms] and V[At] can be derived along the same lines.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal consumption and investment problem is
max
Cs,Mds
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−βsU
(
Cs,M
d
s
)
ds
]
, (A.10)
where U(Ct,M
d
t ) =
1
γ
((
Ct(M
d
t )
ξ
)γ − 1) subject to the capital constraint in Equation (8). To simplify
our notation, let Xt = (At, vt) such that the value function is given by
V = V (t,Kt, Xt) = max{Cs,Mds }t≤s<∞
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−βsU
(
Cs,M
d
s
)
ds
]
. (A.11)
In equilibrium, there exists a value function V (t,Kt, Xt) and control variables {Ct,Mdt } satisfying
the HJB equation
− ∂V (t,Kt, Xt)
∂t
= max
{Ct,Mdt }
{
a(t)U(Ct,M
d
t ) +AV (t,Kt, Xt)
}
, (A.12)
where a(t) = e−βt. By standard time-homogeneity arguments for infinite horizon problems we have
that
eβtV (t,Kt, Xt) = max{Cs,Mds }t≤s<∞
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−β(s−t)U
(
Cs,M
d
s
)
ds
]
= max
{Ct+u,Mdt+u}t≤u<∞
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−βuU(Ct+u,Mdt+u)du
]
= max
{Cu,Mdu}0≤u<∞
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−βuU(Cu,Mdu)du
]
≡ H (Kt, Xt) , (A.13)
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where the third equality follows because the optimal robust control is Markov and H(Kt, Xt) is
independent of time. Therefore, we conjecture that the value function has the following form
V (t,Kt, Xt) = a(t)H (Kt, Xt) = e
−βtH (Kt, Xt) =
e−βt
γ
((
eφ(Xt)Kt
ξ
)γ − 1) , (A.14)
where φ : R2 → R is CN -differentiable function of the state vector Xt that needs to be determined
in equilibrium. Inserting (A.14) into the HJB equation in (A.12), the first order conditions are
C∗t =
Kt
(
Kt
Qeφ(Xt)
)−γ
βQ

βQ
(
Kt
Qeφ(Xt)
)γ(− (γ−1)β 11−γ Q 11−γKt 1−γQγ−1 e γφ(Xt)1−γξ
) 1−γ
γξ+γ−1
−ξ
Kt

γ
γ−1
,
(A.15)
Md∗t =
(1− γ)β 11−γQ 11−γKt 1−γQγ−1 e γφ(Xt)1−γ
ξ

1−γ
γξ+γ−1
, (A.16)
with Q = 1 + ξ. In general, the function φ(Xt) cannot be obtained in closed form. However, we can
obtain an asymptotic expansion to φ(Xt) with respect to the risk aversion parameter γ. Assuming
a power series expression for φ(Xt) in γ as follows
φ(Xt) = φ0(Xt) + γφ1(Xt) +O(γ
2),
where φ0(X, t) is obtained from the logarithmic utility case, we can then solve the HJB problem in
Equation (A.12) for γ 6= 0 in closed form. To do so, we solve first the HJB problem in the case where
utility of the representative agent is logarithmic.
A.2.1 Log-utility case
Note that for γ → 0 the utility reduces to
lim
γ→0
U(Ct,M
d
t ) = log(Ct) + ξ log
(
Mdt
)
. (A.17)
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The optimal consumption and investment problem is34
max
Cs,Mds
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−βs
[
log(Cs) + ξ log
(
Mds
)]
ds
]
, (A.18)
subject to the capital constraint in Equation (8). In equilibrium, there exists a value function
V log (t,Kt, Xt) = a(t)H
log (Kt, Xt) and control variables {Ct,Mdt } satisfying the HJB equation
− ∂a(t)H
log (Kt, Xt)
∂t
= a(t)
(
max
{Ct,Mdt }
{
U log(Ct,M
d
t ) +AH log (Kt, Xt)
})
. (A.19)
We consider the following linear conjecture for the value function V log(·):
a(t)H log(Kt, Xt) = e
−βt [Q log (Kt) + φ0(Xt)] , (A.20)
where the function φ0(Xt) is affine in the state variables, i.e.,
35
φ(Xt) = φ00 + φ0AAt + φ0vvt. (A.21)
Applying the generator to Equation (A.20), using the productivity, the policy uncertainty, and the
capital accumulation dynamics in Equation (2), (4) and (9), we obtain
AV log = ∂V
log
∂K
µK(At) +
∂V log
∂A
µA(At, vt) +
∂V log
∂v
µv(vt) +
1
2
∂2V log
∂K2
σ2K(vt)
= Q
[
−
(
Ct
Kt
+
Mdt
Kt
)
+ (µy + qAAt − δ)− 1
2
σ2Y (kY + vt)
]
(A.22)
+ (κA (θA −At) + λvt)φ0A + κv (θv − vt)φ0v. (A.23)
The first order optimality conditions for consumption and money holdings are
e−βt
Ct
− Q
β
e−βt
Kt
= 0⇐⇒ C∗t =
βKt
Q
, (A.24)
e−βtξ
Mdt
− Q
β
e−βt
Kt
= 0⇐⇒Md∗t =
βξKt
Q
. (A.25)
Substituting the optimal controls C∗t and Md∗t into Equation (A.19) and matching coefficients of
log(Kt), At, vt, and the constant terms, we obtain
Q = 1 + ξ, φ0A =
qAQ
(κA + β)
, φ0v =
2λφ0A −Qσ2Y
2(κv + β)
, (A.26)
34The proof of this proposition is similar to the one presented in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005).
35Due to money neutrality, the nominal factor mt does not affect the real side of the economy. Because of this
property, the affine conjecture in (A.21) does not include mt since for optimality it has to be the case that φ0m = 0.
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and φ00 is a lengthy expression depending only on the model parameters. The coefficients are all
uniquely determined, state-independent and also independent of Kt. Substituting the expressions
back into the HJB equations verifies our guess in (A.20). Furthermore, to prove the transversality
condition, we need to verify that limt→∞ E
[
e−βtH(Kt, At, vt)
]
= 0. Since the value function guess
is additive in log(Kt) as well as At and vt, we can treat each term individually. First, since both
At and vt are mean reverting processes, multiplying the guess by e
−βt will always converge to zero
exponentially fast as long as β > 0. Next, applying Itoˆ’s formula to Zt := log(Kt) gives
dZt =
(
µK∗(At, vt)− 1
2
σ2Y (kY + vt)
)
dt+ σY
√
kY + vtdW
Y
t , (A.27)
which after integrating from 0 to t and taking unconditional expectation gives
E[Zt] = Z0 +
(
µK∗
(
θA +
λθv
κA
, θv
)
− 1
2
σ2Y (kY + θv)
)
t, Z0 ∈ R+. (A.28)
where µK∗
(
θA +
λθv
κA
, θv
)
refers to the drift of capital in (18) evaluated at the unconditional first
moments of productivity At and policy uncertainty vt. Finally, pre-multiplying (A.28) by e
−βt and
passing to the limit using l’Hoˆpital’s rule shows that
lim
t→∞ = e
−βtE[Zt] = 0,
which verifies that the transversality condition is satisfied.
A.2.2 Perturbed solution
Let V = V (t,Kt, Xt) denote the value function as given in Equation (A.11). Utility is now given by
the following non-separable preferences
U(Ct,M
d
t ) =
1
γ
((
Ct(M
d
t )
ξ
)γ − 1) . (A.29)
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From the HJB equation in (A.12), the optimal consumption C∗t and money demand Md∗t policy
holdings are given by36
C∗t =
(
Mdt
)−ξ (Q(Mdt )−ξ (KtQeφ(Xt))γ
βKt
) 1
γ−1
, (A.30)
Md∗t =
(
QC−γt Kt
γQ−1eγφ(Xt)
βξ
) 1
γξ−1
, (A.31)
where Q = 1 + ξ. Next, inserting optimal money demand (A.31) into the first order condition of
consumption (A.30), using the power series representation of φ(Xt) as given in Equation (14) and
perturbing the resulting expression around the log-utility case (and analogously for optimal money
demand), the perturbed optimal consumption and money holdings are given by
C∗,Pt =
βKt
(1 + ξ)
[
1 + γ
(
log
(
β1+ξξξ
(1 + ξ)1+ξ
)
− φ0(Xt)
)]
+O(γ2), (A.32)
Md∗,Pt =
βξKt
(1 + ξ)
[
1 + γ
(
log
(
β1+ξξξ
(1 + ξ)1+ξ
)
− φ0(Xt)
)]
+O(γ2). (A.33)
There are a number of important conclusions that can be drawn from the optimal perturbed solutions
in Equations (A.32) and (A.33). First, both equations only depend on φ0(Xt) and do not depend
on φ1(Xt), which implies that solving the consumption-investment problem with log-utility is suffi-
cient to fully characterize the optimal perturbed consumption and money holdings up to first order.
Secondly, C∗,Pt and M
d∗,P
t are affine functions not only of capital Kt but also of the state vector
Xt. This property of the solution will not only render the equilibrium path process of Kt affine,
but also implies that optimal inflation dynamics dp∗t /p∗t remain affine in the state variables. Next,
substituting C∗,Pt and M
d∗,P
t into Equation (9) immediately gives the equilibrium capital process
K∗t in Equation (16). To derive the equilibrium price dynamics in (17), we apply Itoˆ’s lemma to the
money market clearing condition MSt = p
∗
tM
d∗
t and obtain
37
dMSt = M
∗d
t dp
∗
t + p
∗
tdM
d∗
t + Ct
(
dp∗t , dM
∗d
t
)
. (A.34)
36Inserting Equation (A.30) into (A.31) gives the optimal money demand in Equation (A.16) from which the optimal
consumption in Equation (A.15) can easily be deduced.
37Assuming that at t = 0 markets are cleared. Hence, p∗0M
d∗
0 = M
S
0 .
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Then using the optimal controls C∗t and Md∗t and inserting the money market clearing condition
from Equation (A.34) yields
dp∗t
p∗t
=
dMSt
MSt
− dK
∗
t
K∗t
− Ct
(
dp∗t
p∗t
,
dK∗t
K∗t
)
. (A.35)
Inserting the money supply rule of Equation (10) and the equilibrium capital accumulation process
into (A.35) gives the equilibrium price process as in Equation (17). To verify that the guess for the
value function V (·) was correct, we substitute the equilibrium values back into the HJB problem in
Equation (A.12).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
To simplify notation, let κ∗t = log(K∗t ) + βt. Using the equilibrium capital accumulation process
implies that κ∗t satisfies
dκ∗t =
(
µK∗(At, vt)− 1
2
σ2Y (kY + vt)
)
dt+ σY
√
kY + vtdW
Y
t . (A.36)
The Euler condition in Equation (20) can then be expressed as38
B(t, τ) = e−βτEt
[
UC(C
∗
t+τ ,M
d∗
t+τ )
UC(C∗t ,Md∗t )
p∗t
p∗t+τ
]
= e−βτEt
[
K∗t
K∗t+τ
p∗t
p∗t+τ
]
= e−βτEt
[
exp{− log (K∗t+τ)}
exp{− log (K∗t )}
p∗t
p∗t+τ
]
= Et
[
exp{− (log (K∗t+τ)+ β(t+ τ))}
exp{− (log (K∗t ) + βt)}
p∗t
p∗t+τ
]
= Et
[
exp{−κ∗t+τ}
exp{−κ∗t }
p∗t
p∗t+τ
]
. (A.37)
To solve the problem in Equation (A.37) we follow Ulrich (2013) and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005)
and define
f = f(κ∗t , p
∗
t , At, vt,mt, τ) = Et
[
e−κ
∗
t+τ
p∗t+τ
]
. (A.38)
Conjecturing a log-linear guess for f(·) of the form
f(κ∗t , p
∗
t , At, vt,mt, τ) =
e−κ∗t
p∗t
exp {−b0(τ)− bA(τ)At − bv(τ)vt − bm(τ)mt} . (A.39)
If our log-linear guess in Equation (A.39) solves the stochastic problem in (A.38), then it is also the
solution to
− ∂f(·, τ)
∂τ
= Af(·, τ), f(·, 0) = e
−κ∗t
p∗t
. (A.40)
38From the discussion in Section A.2.2, it suffices to derive the Euler equation for the log-utility case.
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The left-hand side of Equation (A.40) is given by
∂f(·, τ)
∂τ
=
[
−b′0(τ)− b
′
A(τ)At − b
′
v(τ)vt − b
′
m(τ)mt
]
f(·, τ). (A.41)
Setting Θt = {κ∗t , p∗t , At, vt,mt}, an application of Itoˆ’s lemma to the right-hand side of (A.40) gives
Af (κ∗t , p∗t , At, vt,mt, τ) =
∑
i∈Θ
∂f
∂Θi
µ(Θit)dt+
1
2
∑
i∈Θ
∂2f
∂Θi2
d〈Θi,Θi〉t +
∑
i,j∈Θ
i 6=j
∂2f
∂ΘiΘj
d〈Θi,Θj〉t. (A.42)
Writing out the expression above and substituting the dynamics of κ∗t , p∗t , At, vt, and mt, we get
Af = ∂f
∂κ∗
(
µK∗(At, vt)− 1
2
(
σ2Y (kY + vt)
))
+
∂f
∂p∗t
p∗t
1
1− η2
[
mt − η1k¯ − η2p¯i
1− η2 +
η1 − 1
1− η2
(
µK∗ (At, vt)− σ
2
Y (kA + vt)
(1− η2)
)]
+
∂f
∂A
(κA(θA −At) + λvt) + ∂f
∂v
κv(θv − vt) + ∂f
∂m
κm(θm −mt)
+
1
2
[
∂2f
∂κ∗2
(
σ2Y (kY + vt)
)
+
∂2f
∂p∗2
p∗2t
[(
η1 − 1
1− η2
)2 (
σ2Y (kY + vt)
)
+
σ2M (kM + vt)
(1− η2)2
]
+
∂2f
∂A2
σ2A(kA + vt) +
∂2f
∂v2
σ2vvt +
∂2f
∂m2
σ2m(km + vt)
]
+
∂2f
∂κ∗∂p∗
p∗t
(η1 − 1)
(1− η2)
(
σ2Y (kY + vt)
)
+
∂2f
∂p∗∂m
(η1 − 1)
(1− η2)
σMσmρMmvt
(η1 − 1) +
∂2f
∂p∗∂v
(η1 − 1)
(1− η2)
σMσvρMvvt
(η1 − 1)
+
∂2f
∂A∂m
ρAmkmσAσm +
(
∂2f
∂p∗∂m
p∗t
ρMvσvσm
(1− η2) +
∂2f
∂A∂v
σAσvρAv +
∂2f
∂A∂m
σAσmρAm +
∂2f
∂m∂v
σmσvρmv
)
vt.
Computing the derivatives and separating variables one obtains the following system of first order
asymptotic (Riccati) ODE’s:
0 = −CA + κAbA(τ) + b′A(τ), (A.43)
0 = Z0v(τ) + bv(τ)Z1v(τ) + Z2vb
2
v(τ) + b
′
v(τ), (A.44)
0 = −Cm + bm(τ)κm + b′m(τ), (A.45)
0 = −b′0(τ) + C0(τ), (A.46)
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subject to bA(0) = bv(0) = bm(0) = b0(0) = 0 and where
Z0v(τ) = Cv +
(
q2A + 2γβφ0A
)(η1 − η2
1− η2
)2 (1− e−κAτ )2σ2A
2κ2A
+
b2m(τ)σ
2
m
2
+bA(τ) (bm(τ)σAσmρAm − λ) ,
Z1v(τ) = κv + σv (bA(τ)σAρAv + bm(τ)σmρmv) +
σMσmρMm
1− η2 ,
Z2v = σ
2
v/2, Hv(τ) =
√
4Z0v(τ)Z2v − Z21v(τ),
C0(τ) = K0 +
∑
i∈{A,v,m}
bi(τ)θiκi, (A.47)
with constants
CA := (qA + γβφ0A)
(
η1 − η2
1− η2
)
, (A.48)
Cm :=
1
1− η2 , (A.49)
Cv := −
σY
(
η21σY − η1(η2σY + σY − 1) + η22σY − (η2 − 1)σY − 1
)
+ σ2M
(η2 − 1)2 , (A.50)
where the constant K0 is a lengthy expression. The time-to-maturity function C0(τ) collects all the
non-state dependent terms. For the existence of a solution to the bond pricing PDE that excludes
arbitrage opportunities, we require that the Riccati equations in (A.44) above satisfy the following
periodicity condition
4Z0v(τ)Z2v − Z21v(τ) < 0, ∀ τ ≥ 0. (A.51)
This condition essentially rules out singularities of the solution of the Riccati equation above, i.e.,
for τ ≥ 0, the function bv(τ) is continuous in τ .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We derive the first order asymptotic nominal short rate and the market prices of real and nominal
risks when the investor has CRRA utility. The nominal short rate is defined as the following limit
Rt = lim
τ→0
Y (t, τ) = lim
τ→0
−1
τ
(log(B(t, τ))) . (A.52)
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To prove Equation (27) we make repeated use of Bernoulli’s rule. For instance, to compute limτ→0
b0(τ)
τ
we set f(τ) =
∫ τ
0 C0(u)du and g(τ) = τ . Then, using Leibniz’ integral rule we obtain
lim
τ→0
f(τ)
g(τ)
= lim
τ→0
f
′
(τ)
g′(τ)
= lim
τ→0
C0(τ) = K0,
Similarly we have
lim
τ→0
bA(τ)
τ
= CA, lim
τ→0
bv(τ)
τ
= −Z0v(0) = Cv, lim
τ→0
bm(τ)
τ
=
1
1− η2 , (A.53)
which gives the expression for the short rate in Equation (27). Next, to derive the bond excess
return, we apply Itoˆ’s rule to the closed-form bond price formula in Equation (21) and obtain the
following dynamics
dB(t, τ)
B(t, τ)
=
∂B(t, τ)
∂t
dt+
∑
i∈Θ
∂B(t, τ)
∂Θi
dΘit +
1
2
∑
i∈Θ
∂2B(t, τ)
∂Θi2
d〈Θi,Θi〉t, (A.54)
where Θ = {A, v,m}. Taking time t conditional expectation on both sides and using Equation (A.44)
from above, we obtain after some algebra that the expected infinitesimal bond risk premia is given
by
RP (t, τ) =
1
dt
Et
[
dB(t, τ)
B(t, τ)
−Rtdt
]
=
bv(τ)kmρMmσmσM
η2 − 1 +
bv(τ)(ρMvσMσv + ρMmσmσM )
η2 − 1 vt,
(A.55)
which is the expression in Equation (28). The results for the log-utility agent can be easily derived
by simply setting γ = 0 in Proposition (4).
A.5 Model-implied moments
The model-implied unconditional nominal term structure and volatility curve are given by
E[Y (t, τ)] =
b0(τ)
τ
+
bA(τ)
τ
(
θA +
λθv
κA
)
+
bv(τ)
τ
θv +
bm(τ)
τ
θm, (A.56)
√
V[dY (t, τ)] =
1
τ
√
V
[
dB(t, τ)
B(t, τ)
]
=
1
τ
√
Γ0(τ) + θvΓ1(τ), (A.57)
Γ0(τ) = kAσ
2
Ab
2
A(τ) + kmσ
2
mb
2
m(τ) + kmσAσmρAmbA(τ)bm(τ) (A.58)
Γ1(τ) =
∑
i∈I
bi(τ)
2σ2i + 2
∑
i,j∈I
i 6=j
bi(τ)σibj(τ)σjρij , (A.59)
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where I = {A,m, v}. To derive the results above, we need the unconditional moments of the factors
At,mt, vt, which we provided in Appendix A.1.
A.6 Model-implied regression coefficient
Bond excess returns over a time period t, t+ h and maturity τ are given by
rE,τt,t+h = log (B(t+ h, τ − h))− log (B(t, τ))− Y (t, h), (A.60)
= log (B(t+ h, τ − h))− log (B(t, τ)) + 1
h
log (B(t, h)) . (A.61)
The theoretical slope coefficient βτ,hv , of a univariate regression of excess returns r
E,τ
t,t+h onto policy
uncertainty vt is given by
βτ,hv =
C
(
rE,τt,t+h, vt
)
V(vt)
, (A.62)
where the denominator is derived in Equation (A.7). We now show the derivation of the covariance
term in Equation (A.62). An application of Itoˆ’s lemma to Equation (21) shows that the bond price
has the dynamics
dB(t, τ) =
∂B(t, τ)
∂t
dt+
∑
i∈Θ
∂B(t, τ)
∂Θi
dΘit +
1
2
∑
i,j∈Θ
∂2B(t, τ)
∂Θi∂Θj
d〈Θi,Θj〉t
= B(t, τ)
[
b
′
0(τ) +
∑
i∈Θ
(
b
′
Θi(τ)Θ
i
t −B(t, τ)bΘi(τ)µ
(
Θit
))]
dt−B(t, τ)
∑
i∈Θ
bΘi(τ)σ(Θ
i
t)dW
Θi
t
+
1
2
B(t, τ)
∑
i,j∈Θ
ρΘiΘjbΘi(τ)bΘj (τ)σ(Θ
i
t)σ(Θ
j
t )
 dt, (A.63)
where µ
(
Θit
)
is the drift part of the diffusion Θit where Θt = {At, vt,mt}, i.e., µ
(
Θ1t
)
= µ(At) =
κA (θA −At) + λvt, µ
(
Θ3t
)
= µ(mt) = κm (θm −mt) and µ
(
Θ2t
)
= µ(vt) = κv (θv − vt), respectively.
Likewise, σ
(
Θ1t
)
= σ(vt) = σA(kA + vt), σ
(
Θ2t
)
= σ(vt) = σm(km + vt) and σ
(
Θ3t
)
= σ(vt) = σvvt.
Therefore, using Equation (A.63), we obtain that the log-bond price has the following dynamics
d (log (B(t, τ))) =
[
b
′
0(τ) +
∑
i∈Θ
(
b
′
Θi(τ)Θ
i
t − bΘi(τ)µ
(
Θit
))]
dt−
∑
i∈Θ
bΘi(τ)σ(Θ
i
t)dW
Θi
t
= µB(t, τ)dt−
∑
i∈Θ
bΘi(τ)σ(Θ
i
t)dW
Θi
t . (A.64)
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Using Equation (A.64), we can rewrite
log (B(t+ h, τ − h))− log (B(t, τ)) =
∫ t+h
t
d (log (B(s, t+ τ − s)))
−1
h
log (B(t, h)) =
1
h
(log (B(t+ h, 0))− log (B(t, h))) = 1
h
∫ t+h
t
d (log(B(s, t+ h− s))) ,
to express the excess return in Equation (A.61) as
rE,τt,t+h =
∫ t+h
t
[
µB(s, t+ τ − s)− 1
h
µB(s, t+ h− s)
]
ds
−
∑
i∈Θ
∫ t+h
t
[
bΘi(t+ τ − s)−
1
h
bΘi(t+ h− s)
]
σ(Θit)dW
Θi
s . (A.65)
Since the Brownian motions WΘ
i
t are independent for s > t, we can focus on the drift part in
(A.65). Then, the covariance between excess bond returns over the time interval t to t+h and policy
uncertainty vt is given by
C
(
rE,τt,t+h, vt
)
= C
(∫ t+h
t
∑
i∈Θ
[(
b
′
Θi(t+ τ − s)−
b
′
Θi
(t+ h− s)
h
)
Θis
−
(
bΘi(t+ τ − s)−
bΘi(t+ h− s)
h
)
µ
(
Θis
)]
ds, vt
)
=
∫ t+h
t
∑
i∈Θ
(
b
′
Θi(t+ τ − s)−
b
′
Θi
(t+ h− s)
h
)
C
(
Θis, vt
)
ds
−
∫ t+h
t
∑
i∈Θ
(
bΘi(t+ τ − s)−
bΘi(t+ h− s)
h
)
C
(
µ
(
Θis
)
, vt
)
ds, (A.66)
where the second equality follows due to Fubini’s theorem. Equation (A.66) implies that in order to
compute the unconditional covariance between excess returns and economic policy uncertainty vt,
we need the covariances between the state variables Θs and vt. These are provided in Section (A.1).
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Tables
45
Panel A: Economic policy uncertainty vt
κv 0.169 θv 1.072 σv 0.177
(0.041) (0.069) (0.014)
Panel B: Matched and fixed parameters
k¯ 0.156 p¯i 0.165
Panel C: Calibrated parameters
β 0.026 kA 0.375 ρAm −0.884 κA 3.358
ξ 0.463 kM 4.311 ρAv 0.168 θA 9.791
γ −0.466 km 0.119 ρMm 0.399 σA 2.354
δ 0.075 kY 4.903 ρMv −0.240 κm 0.363
η1 −1.012 µY 0.497 ρmv −0.566 θm 10.091
η2 −2.242 σY 0.638 λ −5.275 σm 8.252
qA 2.959 σM 2.548
Table 1: Summary of parameter values. In Panel A, we report the maximum likelihood estimates for the
policy uncertainty process vt. We proxy vt using the EPU index, which we scale by dividing it by 100. In
brackets, we report the corresponding asymptotic robust standard errors (’Sandwich estimator’) based on the
outer product of the Jacobian of the log-likelihood function. In Panel B, we report the matched and fixed
parameters. The remaining parameters in Panel C are calibrated to match simultaneously the unconditional
yield and bond volatility curves. Estimation period is January 1990 to September 2015 (309 data points) using
monthly data.
46
1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
1
τ bv(τ) −0.008 −0.015 −0.024 −0.041 −0.054 −0.065
Table 2: The table reports the calibrated values for the policy uncertainty factor loadings bv(τ)/τ , obtained
using the parameters as given in Table 1. The function bv(τ) solves the Ricatti Equation in (23).
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Economic conditions Financial variables Macroeconomic controls
Mat EPU VIX CFN TIV DY TS IP CPI R2(adj)
1Y −3.715∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.28
−4.047∗∗∗ 0.020 0.038 1.201 − − − − 0.30
−2.727∗∗∗ 0.001 0.680∗∗∗ 2.371∗∗ −1.133∗∗∗ 1.916∗∗∗ − − 0.70
−2.843∗∗∗ 0.023 0.922∗∗∗ 2.112∗∗ −1.084∗∗∗ 1.955∗∗∗ −0.792 1.885∗∗ 0.71
2Y −3.693∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.27
−3.912∗∗∗ 0.004 0.095 1.843∗ − − − − 0.30
−3.000∗∗∗ 0.003 0.714∗∗∗ 2.508∗∗ −0.967∗∗∗ 1.994∗∗∗ − − 0.66
−3.127∗∗∗ 0.028 0.970∗∗∗ 2.220∗∗ −0.912∗∗∗ 2.035∗∗∗ −0.839 2.095∗∗ 0.67
3Y −3.529∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.27
−3.676∗∗∗ −0.008 0.108 2.237∗∗ − − − − 0.31
−3.070∗∗∗ 0.004 0.693∗∗∗ 2.534∗∗ −0.823∗∗∗ 1.987∗∗∗ − − 0.63
−3.202∗∗∗ 0.028 0.931∗∗∗ 2.237∗∗ −0.767∗∗∗ 2.024∗∗∗ −0.789 2.181∗∗∗ 0.64
5Y −3.045∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.23
−3.060∗∗∗ −0.028 0.130 2.770∗∗∗ − − − − 0.29
−2.919∗∗∗ 0.002 0.650∗∗∗ 2.521∗∗ −0.592∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗ − − 0.59
−3.052∗∗∗ 0.025 0.844∗∗ 2.222∗∗ −0.537∗∗∗ 1.957∗∗∗ −0.657 2.222∗∗∗ 0.60
7Y −2.632∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.20
−2.595∗∗∗ −0.033 0.153 2.930∗∗∗ − − − − 0.27
−2.681∗∗∗ 0.004 0.628∗∗∗ 2.427∗∗∗ −0.465∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗ − − 0.55
−2.818∗∗∗ 0.027 0.792∗∗ 2.119∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗ 1.868∗∗∗ −0.569 2.314∗∗∗ 0.57
10Y −2.116∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.15
−1.979∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗ 0.141 3.098∗∗∗ − − − − 0.25
−2.284∗∗∗ −0.002 0.578∗∗∗ 2.345∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗ 1.790∗∗∗ − − 0.55
−2.412∗∗∗ 0.019 0.722∗∗ 2.057∗∗ −0.296∗∗ 1.809∗∗∗ −0.504 2.169∗∗∗ 0.56
Table 3: Yield curve regressions. The table displays slope coefficients of the regression of yields on EPUt
(EPU) and different controls for economic conditions (VIX, CFN, TIV), financial variables (DY, TS), and
macroeconomic controls (IP, CPI). The yield maturities are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. The last column
reports the adjusted R2-values. By ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ we denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. By ∗∗∗, **, *
we denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance according to the HAC-robust t-statistics. The definitions
of the control variables are given in Section 3.2. The sample period is January 1990 to September 2015.
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Economic conditions Financial variables Macroeconomic controls
Mat EPU VIX CFN TIV DY TS IP CPI R2(adj)
1Y 1.973∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.33
1.954∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.010 −0.582 − − − − 0.34
1.549∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.169 −0.972 0.308∗∗∗ −0.444∗∗∗ − − 0.45
1.618∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.175 −0.817 0.281∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗∗ 0.056 −1.213∗∗ 0.46
2Y 2.013∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.43
1.941∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.080 −0.093 − − − − 0.43
1.707∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.243∗∗∗ −0.259 0.252∗∗∗ −0.528∗∗∗ − − 0.55
1.753∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.256∗ −0.157 0.234∗∗∗ −0.527∗∗∗ 0.066 −0.793∗ 0.56
3Y 1.721∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.45
1.618∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.067 0.077 − − − − 0.45
1.503∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.197∗∗ 0.036 0.176∗∗∗ −0.448∗∗∗ − − 0.56
1.543∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.152 0.126 0.161∗∗∗ −0.437∗∗∗ −0.111 −0.733∗∗ 0.57
5Y 1.271∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.45
1.140∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.068 0.007 − − − − 0.47
1.100∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.147∗∗ 0.021 0.097∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ − − 0.54
1.131∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.127 0.090 0.085∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗ −0.039 −0.559∗∗ 0.54
7Y 0.953∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.42
0.825∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.054 0.018 − − − − 0.44
0.816∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.110∗∗ 0.053 0.062∗∗ −0.211∗∗ − − 0.50
0.845∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.090 0.119 0.051∗ −0.205∗∗ −0.044 −0.529∗∗∗ 0.51
10Y 0.673∗∗∗ − − − − − − − 0.38
0.538∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ −0.037 0.029 − − − − 0.43
0.531∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.077∗ 0.052 0.044∗∗ −0.148∗∗ − − 0.48
0.554∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.051 0.105 0.035∗ −0.141∗∗ −0.064 −0.428∗∗∗ 0.49
Table 4: Bond yield volatility regressions. The table displays slope coefficients of the regression of yield
volatilities on EPUt (EPU) and different controls for economic conditions (VIX, CFN, TIV), financial variables
(DY, TS), and macroeconomic controls (IP, CPI). The yield maturities are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. The
last column reports the adjusted R2-values. By ∗∗∗, **, * we denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
By ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ we denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance according to the HAC-robust t-statistics. The
definitions of the control variables are given in Section 3.2. The sample period is January 1990 to September
2015.
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Panel A: Average bond yields and EPU
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Panel B: Average bond yield volatility and EPU
Figure 1: Average US Treasury bond yields (Panel A, solid line) and realized yield volatility (Panel B, solid
line) with maturity τ = 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y and 10Y and the economic policy uncertainty index (EPU, dashed
line) as constructed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). The sample period ranges from January 1990 until
September 2015.
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Panel A: Response of fed funds to EPU shock
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Panel B: Response of EPU to fed funds shock
Figure 2: The figure plots the impulse response functions of a shock to the EPU on the short rate (Panel
A) and a shock to the short rate on the EPU (Panel B). The short rate is approximated by the three-month
T-bill rate. The impulse response functions are based on a bivariate VAR model including the EPU and the
effective funds rate. The data sample spans the period from January 1990 to September 2015. The shaded
are corresponds to the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3: Total factor productivity and the EPU index. The solid line represents the univariate regression
line of TFP onto EPU. The estimated slope coefficient is βˆEPU = −0.024 with corresponding HAC-robust
standard error of SE
(
βˆEPU
)
= 0.0068. The data are annually and range from 1990 until 2015. Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics and time series name is Multi-factor productivity.
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Panel A: Empirical and calibrated yield curve 
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Panel B: Empirical and calibrated volatility term structure
Figure 4: Empirical and fitted affine yield curve model. In Panel A we plot the empirical unconditional nom-
inal yield curve based on monthly zero-coupon bonds (solid line) with the model-implied yield curve (dashed
line). Panel B compares the model-implied bond volatility term-structure (dashed line) to the empirical un-
conditional realized volatility term structure (solid line). Unconditional realized volatility is computed using
monthly log-yield changes. The model-implied yields and volatilities are based on the parameters in Table 1.
Sample period ranges from January 1990 until September 2015.
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Panel A: Yield regression without controls 
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Panel B: Yield regression with controls 
Figure 5: Yield curve regressions. Panel A compares the empirical slope coefficient of the univariate regression
of yields Y (t, τ) onto the EPU (dashed line) with the model-implied regression coefficient (solid line) given in
Equation (37). The yield maturities are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. Panel B plots the regression coefficient
we obtain by including all the controls for economic, financial, and macroeconomic conditions (dashed line).
Shaded areas represent HAC-robust 95% confidence bounds. The sample period ranges from January 1990
until September 2015.
56
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maturity (years)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Be
ta
 c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
Panel C: Volatility regression without controls 
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Panel D: Volatility regression with controls 
Figure 6: Bond yield volatility regressions. Panel A compares the empirical slope coefficient of the univariate
regression of conditional bond yield volatility Vt(Y (t, τ)) onto the EPU (dashed line) with the model-implied
regression coefficient (solid line) defined in Equation (38). The yield maturities are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years.
Panel B plots the regression coefficient we obtain by including all the controls for economic, financial, and
macroeconomic conditions (dashed line). Shaded areas represent HAC-robust 95% confidence bounds. The
sample period ranges from January 1990 until September 2015.
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Panel A: Bond risk premia regression without controls 
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Panel B: Bond risk premia regression with controls  
Figure 7: Bond risk premium regressions. The figure compares the empirical slope coefficient of the univariate
regression of bond excess returns as defined in (43) on the EPU (dashed line) with the model-implied regression
coefficient (solid line) given in Equation (39). The yield maturities are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. Panel B plots
the regression coefficient we obtain by including all the controls for economic, financial, and macroeconomic
conditions (dashed line). Shaded areas represent HAC-robust 95% confidence bounds. The sample period
ranges from January 1990 until September 2015.
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